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system of justice could be developed without serious administra-
tive difficulties by requiring the committing officer at the pre-
liminary hearing to inform the defendant of his right to counsel
and to appoint counsel on the same basis that the trial judge
now does in the federal courts. To supplement this appointment
at the preliminary hearing, it would be necessary to strictly en-
force the present requirement that an arrested person be brought
before the committing officer without unreasonable delay. These
two provisions, presentment before a committing officer without
unreasonable delay and appointment of counsel at the preliminary
hearing, would virtually abolish the injustices of pre-trial pro-
cedure to the indigent defendant. A persistence in following our
current practice of handling the right to counsel in the pre-trial
period can only lead to further disrepute of our criminal law ad-
ministration.
C. GmsoN DOWNING JR.
MISREPRESENTATION-BASIS OF LIABILITY-DAMAGES
AT LAW AND EQUITABLE RESCISSION IN KENTUCKY
From a historical point of view, the law in regard to mis-
representation has shown a gradual but unmistakable trend to-
ward granting relief more readily to those whose interests have
been prejudiced because of the breach of a confidence justly re-
posed. At common law, the remedy for misrepresentation, or
fraud, as it has been usually called, was an action on the case
for deceit.' To secure relief in this action, the plaintiff had to
prove either that the defendant knew his representation to be
false, or that he made the statement recklessly, without caring
whether it was true or false.2 However, equity courts were not
bound by the common law definitions of fraud in granting relief.
For instance, where there was an innocent misrepresentation by a
vendor, the vendee was allowed to return his purchase, rescind
the transaction, and recover his consideration without proving the
element of intent which was required in actions at law. Courts
'23 Am. Jun. 771 (1989).
'Id. at 773. In Kentucky, see Smith v. Barton, 266 S.W. 2d 317 (Ky. 1954);
Southern Express Co. v. Fox & Logan, 131 Ky. 257, 115 S.W. 184 (1909).
'PROSSER, ToRTs, 708 (1941). See also for equitable estoppel, equitable de-
fenses, etc., Id. at 712-718.
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of law, jealous of the expanding power of these chancery courts,
sought to broaden legal jurisdiction into equitable fields. The
common law action of assumpsit was extended by the use of a
legal fiction, and where misrepresentation was involved in a trans-
action, the plaintiff was permitted to waive the tort and sue in
assumpsit, rescinding the transaction and recovering his con-
sideration. This was called "restitution." In some instances, this
rescission at law was allowed even though the misrepresentation
was made through honest mistake, the court basing the right of
recovery on the equitable idea of preventing unjust enrichment.5
The law also recognized that an equitable defense might be
set up against a common law action. If a person were induced
by a misrepresentation to enter into a contract, he could set up
this misrepresentation as an equitable defense to an action at law
on the contract. Modem codes of procedure, merging law and
equity, allow a defendant to plead a defense based on equitable
principles.0
Today, in a growing minority of jurisdictions in the United
States, scienter and fraudulent intent are no longer elements of
actionable fraud even in a suit at law, and damages may be
awarded although the misrepresentation was made innocently
and the defendant honestly believed his statements to be true.
Although most jurisdictions still require intent to deceive as an
element of an action at law for fraud,8 they generally recognize
the doctrine of equitable rescission, whereby the transaction may
be avoided, and the consideration returned to the purchaser,
without proof of intent to deceive. Kentucky, however, still re-
quires proof of fraudulent intent in actions for misrepresentation
whether based on legal or equitable theories.10 While this is in
'Id. at 710.5 Id. at 711-712.
'Id. at 713.
'Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 117 N.W. 581 at 583 (1908); Paul v.
Cameron, 127 Neb. 510, 256 N.W. 11 at 14 (1934); 23 Am. Jur. 927-928 (1939);
37 C.J.S. 265 (1943).
' McGuffin v. Smith, 215 Ky. 606, 286 S.W. 884 (1926); Morrow v. Franklin,
289 Mo. 549, 233 S.W. 224 at 228 (1921); 23 Am. Jun. 910 (1939); 37 C.J.S. 259(1943).
"New York Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 73 F. 2d 350 (8th Cir. 1934), 97 A.L.R.
562; Leach v. Central Trust Co., 203 Iowa 1060, 213 N.W. 777 at 779 (1927); 23
Am. Jun. 929 (1939).
, Miles v. Profitt, 266 S.W. 2d 333 (Ky. 1954); Livermore v. Middlesborough
Town-Lands Co., 106 Ky. 140 at 163, 50 S.W. 6 at 13 (1899).
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agreement with the majority view regarding actions at law, Ken-
tucky is practically the only state which requires proof of an in-
tent to deceive before an equitable rescission can be secured.
The majority rule, requiring fraudulent intent in a legal action
for deceit, is followed by Kentucky,': and is stated, in general
terms, in McGuffin v. Smith." In order to establish actionable
fraud it is necessary:
(1) That defendant made a material representation; (2)
that it was false; (3) that when he made it he knew that it
was false, or made it recklessly, without any knowledge of
its truth, and as a positive assertion; (4) that he made it
with the intention that it should be acted upon by the plain-
tiff; (5) that plaintiff acted in reliance upon it, and (6) that
he thereby suffered injury.13
The intentional concealment of material facts may also con-
stitute actionable fraud, because a false impression is created
upon the mind of the other party to a transaction. 14 Deception is
present, regardless of the fact that no positive assertion is made,
and the deception is intended by the party who remains silent.
The Kentucky rule also recognizes what amounts to inferred
or presumed fraud, as opposed to actual fraud.'5 Under this doc-
trine, a plaintiff must prove scienter in order to recover for a mis-
representation, but the intent to deceive may be established from
the facts proved by appropriate inference or presumption.1" The
Kentucky court expressed the requisite for this type of fraud in
the case of Bunch v. Bertram:
But when the vendor makes a positive statement of some-
thing which is alleged by him to be true, and vendee is
misled by such positive statement, and when the vendee did
not know of its falsity, and could not have ascertained its
falsity by the exercise of ordinary care, the vendor can be
held responsible in damages, although he did not know that
Smith v. Barton, 266 S.W. 2d 317 at 318 (Ky. 1954); Southern Express Co.
v. Fox & Logan, supra note 2; 23 Am. Jun. 773 (1939); 37 C.J.S. 259, 260 (1943).
' McGuffin v. Smith, supra note 8.
'1 Id. at 612, 286 S.W. at 886.
'
4 Crescent Grocery Co. v. Vick, 194 Ky. 727, 240 S.W. 388 (1922).
'Combs v. Poulos, 241 Ky. 617, 44 S.W. 2d 571 (1931); 37 C.J.S. 210-212
(1943). This is called "constructive" fraud by some courts, and is defined as a
breach of legal or equitable duty which is deemed to be fraudulent because of its
tendency to deceive.
"Commonwealth v. Smith, 242 Ky. 365, 46 S.W. 2d 475 (1932); Combs v.
Poulos, supra note 15; 37 C.J.S. 259-260 (1943).
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his positive statement was untrue at the time he made it.
When a party asserts that something is true, when he does
not know whether it is true or untrue, he is practicing a
fraud on the party with whom he deals.17
Intent may be inferred from the acts of a party, but it cannot
be predicated on mere mistake or negligence. Fraud is synony-
mous with bad faith or dishonesty, and is distinguishable from
mistake or negligence.18
Under the majority rule, when fraud is involved in the making
of a contract, the person who is injured has an election of reme-
dies. He may seek to recover his damages, or he may elect to
repudiate the transaction and be restored to the status quo, but,
he cannot do both.'9 Kentucky Electric Development Company's
Receiver v. Head"° held where fraud has induced a contract, the
plaintiff may either sue for damages, or rescind the transaction,
recovering the consideration.
Equity also will grant relief when false representations are
made with knowledge of their falsity, or where statements are
made recklessly, without regard to their truth or falsity. In most
jurisdictions, equity will also allow recission of a contract when
it appears that there were misrepresentations which actually did
mislead the person to whom they were made, even though such
statements were made innocently, as a result of misapprehension
or mistake. No intent to deceive need be shown.2' This type of
relief is granted because the mistake operates as a surprise and
an imposition, and the agreement is actually unadvised and
entered into without a real meeting of the minds, since the party
misled had no actual intent to enter into the contract upon the
terms which in fact did exist. Equity intervenes to protect those
of whom undue advantage is taken."
'219 Ky. 848, 852, 294 S.W. 805, 807-808 (1927).
' Commonwealth v. Smith, 242 Ky. 365, 46 S.W. 2d 474 (1933).
'Ades v. Wash, 199 Ky. 687, 251 S.W. 970 (1923); Sellars v. Adams, 190
Ky. 723, 228 S.W. 424 (1921); 37 C.J.S. 354 (1943).
252 Ky. 656, 68 S.W. 2d 1 (1934). In this case, recission of a transaction
involving the trade of stock was permitted. The plaintiff was allowed to return
the stock which she received, and the defendant was required to send back the
stock or market value thereof, which passed as consideration, because of false
representations concerning dividends which the plaintiff was to receive.
I Benson v. Bunting, 127 Cal. 532, 59 P. 991 (1900); Leach v. Central Trust
Co., 203 Iowa 1060, 213 N.W. 777 (1927); 23 Am. Jun. 929-930 (1939).
11 STOnY, CozacENTAnaIns ON EQurrY JUuRm UDENcE, Sec. 239 (3rd ed.
1842).
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In Kentucky, however, the rule is well settled that scienter is
required both at law and in equity. To secure rescission of a con-
tract, it must appear that there was an intent to deceive, and that
the misrepresentation was made with knowledge of its falsity, or
under circumstances which did not justify a belief in its truth.
The Kentucky rule was not always so strict. At least one of
the early Kentucky cases on this point held that actionable fraud
need not be proved to secure recission of an executed contract.
In Waters v. Mattingly,"3 the sale of a horse was avoided, and the
contract set aside, because the animal was unsound. Recission
was granted even though the vendor was ignorant of any defect,
and though the vendee did not prove an intent to deceive.
Later cases deviated from this holding. A clear statement of
the present Kentucky rule is found in the leading case of Liver-
more v. Middlesborough Town-Lands Co.24 The vendors of some
lots sued to enforce payment for the property. The vendee filed
an answer and counterclaim, alleging that promissory representa-
tions by the vendors, concerning industries and public improve-
ments which were to be developed, had failed to materialize. The
Court of Appeals refused to allow recission of the contract, mak-
ing the following statement:
To establish actionable fraud, or fraud against which equity
will relieve-and, as we have seen, the same rule applies in
Kentucky to both classes of cases-it must appear that the
misrepresentation was of a matter of material fact (as dis-
tinguished from opinion), at the time or previously existing,
(and not a mere promise for the future); must be relied
upon by the person whose action is intended to be in-
fluenced; and must be made with knowledge of its falsity,
or under circumstances which did not justify a belief in its
truth. This is the doctrine deducible from the Kentucky
decisions.2 5
This opinion states that Waters v. Mattingly had been over-
ruled, relying on the decisions in Lightburn v. Cooper20 and Ste-
wart v. Daugherty," but a close inspection of these decisions
makes this assertion somewhat questionable, and the cases them-
'4 Ky. 244 (1808).
106 Ky. 140, 50 S.W. 6 (1899).Id. at 163, 50 S.W. at 13.
31 Ky. 273 (1833).
2'33 Ky. 479 (1835).
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selves are not persuasive. The Lightburn case involved the sale
of a clock, and the vendor's assignee sued at law on a promissory
note which the vendee had given as consideration. The vendee
had previously tendered the clock, and asked recission, on the
grounds that it had been misrepresented as a good time piece.
He now stated these facts as an equitable defense, but the court
gave judgment for the plaintiff because there was no proof of
fraudulent intent on the part of the vendor. No mention, was
made of the previous decision of Waters v. Mattingly.
The case of Stewart v. Daugherty was an action of trover at
law, where a dissatisfied horse-trader claimed the right to rescind
and recover the horse he had given as consideration in the trans-
action. The court denied the right to rescission without proof of
fraud and said:
The old case of Waters v. Mattingly which seems to have
been relied on by the Circuit Judge, as conclusive authority,
is inconsistent with the well-established doctrine of the law,
and has been repeatedly disregarded and overruled by this
Court. The true doctrine is that an innocent misrepresenta-
tion-not being fraudulent-furnishes no cause of action nor
any sufficient ground for rescinding a contract. Unless the
party who makes the misrepresentation knows, when he
makes it, that it is false, he is not deemed guilty of fraud,
however erroneous or untrue it may happen to be.28
It is submitted that the court erred in the Lightburn case, in
refusing to allow the equitable defense of innocent misrepresenta-
tion to prevail. And in the Stewart case, the plaintiffs tender of
the horse he received should have operated as a recission under
equitable principles of unjust enrichment, though there was no
proof of fraudulent intent on the defendant's part. In addition,
the court in stating, in the latter case, that Waters v. Mattingly
had been repeatedly overruled did not cite any authority for that
proposition. Its inconsistency with "the well-established doctrine
of the law (of deceit)" is of no significance, since the Waters case
was brought in equity.
The case of Livermore v. Middlesborough Town-Lands was
the final step in establishing the Kentucky rule, which has been
consistently reaffirmed and quoted with approval in subsequent
21Id. at 480.
KENTucxy LAw JouiNAL
Kentucky cases up to the present date.29 The latest one, Miles v.
Prott,30 was decided at the 1954 term. Recission of the sale of
a motor court was denied in part because the court found no evi-
dence of any misrepresentation on the part of the vendor. How-
ever, the statement was made in the opinion that actionable
fraud must be proved to secure recission of a contract.31
It is submitted that the Kentucky rule, denying recission of a
contract when there has been an innocent misrepresentation, is
contrary to the fundamental principles of equity, which grant
relief where the law affords an inadequate remedy, and which
prevent the injustice of allowing plaintiff to retain what he had
received. Under the Kentucky rule, equitable relief is no sig-
nificance, since the party seeking recission must prove all the ele-
ments of fraud necessary in a legal action for damages. Thus,
equity affords a mere duplicate remedy, and unless recission is
allowed under less rigorous conditions, justice may not always be
attained. Kentucky law regarding misrepresentation follows the
majority view and affords an adequate remedy against fraud, but
the Kentucky doctrine of equitable relief should be overruled.
ROBERT A. PALm
OIL AND GAS-WASTE OF OIL AND GAS
AS BETWEEN ADJACENT LANDOWNERS
The preservation of our natural resources is one of the most
important conservation problems of modem times. The waste of
"' Miles v. Profitt, 266 S.W. 2d 333 (Ky. 1954) and Hargis v. Hargis, 252 Ky.
198, 66 S.W. 2d 59 (1933) (Attack on a judgment by consent of the parties, in a
divorce proceeding; fraud was alleged.) Coons v. Bank of Commerce, 233 Ky.
457, 26 S.W. 2d 15 (1930) (Action by a holder and endorsers of a note on an
absolute guaranty of payment; defense was that the holder fraudulently repre-
sented that the security was worth the debt); Electric Hammer Corporation v.
Deddens, 206 Ky. 232, 267 S.W. 207 (1924) (Action on a note due for the
purchase of stock; defense alleged false representations in the transaction); Towels
et al. v. Campbell, 204 Ky. 591, 264 S.W. 1107 (1924) (Action on a covenant of
general warranty of property bought by the pl. from the def.; alleged misrepre-
sentation of title); Bewley v. Moreman, 162 Ky. 32, 171 S.W. 996 (1915)
(Action for recission of the sale of land alleging misrepresentation on the part of
the vendor); Taylor v. Mullins, 151 Ky. 597, 152 S.W. 774 (1913) (Counterclaim
alleging fraud, which induced the making of a contract to haul logs); Chicago
Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. Beaven, 149 Ky. 267, 148 S.W. 37 (1912) (Action to set
aside a contract for subscriptions to the stock of a corporation to be organized,
on the ground that misrepresentations were involved in the making of the contract).
266 S.W. 2d 333 (Ky. 1954).
Id. at 336.
